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Chapter 10
Cohesive Causes in Ancient Greek Philosophy and 
Medicine
Sean Coughlin
Abstract
This paper is about the history of a question in ancient Greek philosophy and med-
icine: what holds the parts of a whole together? The idea that there is a single cause 
responsible for cohesion is usually associated with the Stoics. They refer to it as the syn­
ectic cause (αἴτιον συνεκτικόν), a term variously translated as ‘cohesive cause,’ ‘contain-
ing cause’ or ‘sustaining cause.’ The Stoics, however, are neither the first nor the only 
thinkers to raise this question or to propose a single answer. Many earlier thinkers offer 
their own candidates for what actively binds parts together, with differing implications 
not only for why we are wholes rather than heaps, but also why our bodies inevitably 
become diseased and fall apart. This paper assembles, up to the time of the Stoics, 
one part of the history of such a cause: what is called ‘the synechon’ (τὸ συνέχον) – 
that which holds things together. Starting with our earliest evidence from Anaximenes 
(sixth century bce), the paper looks at different candidates and especially the models 
and metaphors for thinking about causes of cohesion which were proposed by differ-
ent philosophers and doctors including Empedocles, early Greek doctors, Diogenes of 
Apollonia, Plato and Aristotle. My goal is to explore why these candidates and models 
were proposed and how later philosophical objections to them led to changes in how 
causes of cohesion were understood.
1 Parts and Wholes
Aristotle is often credited with the phrase, ‘the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts.’ He may never have said it (it does not appear in any of the writings we 
have), but that has not stopped it from being quoted, almost always without a 
reference, in order to suggest an ancient pedigree for certain twentieth-century 
topics like holism, synergy, systems theory and emergence – topics at whose 
core is some kind of anti-reductive stance.1 This is not a coincidence. There 
1 The attribution to Aristotle is remarkably common across disciplines. A sample: Vallero 
(2011) 80 on engineering and bioethics; Scalambrino (2018) 56–57 on psychology; Hanson 
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is something Aristotelian about the phrase. After all, Aristotle is the ancient 
Greek philosopher most associated with the idea that some kinds of things in 
the world require explanations that go beyond the enumeration of their parts. 
If Aristotle asked you what a house is, you would not get away with telling him 
that it is the bricks and beams that went into building it, even if you managed 
to mention every one of them; and you certainly would not get away with tell-
ing him that bread is simply flour, salt, water and yeast.2 This is because, for 
Aristotle, if what we are talking about is not a heap of random things, but a 
whole, then citing only a list of ingredients misses something essential about 
the whole the ingredients are meant to explain. They fail to tell us how and 
why the parts are arranged the way they are and so why those parts form a 
unified thing. Not just any arrangement of materials, even of the appropriate 
materials, counts as a barn or a bagel, and Aristotle thinks the same goes for 
natural things as well.3 To understand what a horse is, it is not enough to give 
a list of every hair and hoof. Something more needs to be added, something 
about the overall form and arrangement of those parts for it to count as an 
explanation of a horse. People who study Aristotle today tend to refer to this 
as his hylomorphism: the idea that unified things, especially natural and living 
things, are composed of matter and form and that both need to be mentioned 
(1995) 1 and Forrest (2018) 3 on systems theory; Hanson (2014) 84 on social theory; Elliott 
(2004) 454 on business; Marks et al. (2008) 599 on molecular biology. Schuster (2007) claims 
it is in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but does not cite a passage. It is also associated with Gestalt 
psychology, although no Gestalt theorist seems to have said it either, on which see Fuller 
(1990) 101–2. For a discussion of instances found on the internet (where it pops up quite often 
as well), see the blog, Sententiae Antiquae, ‘No, Aristotle didn’t write “a whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts.” ’ Last accessed at sententiaeantiquae.com/2018/07/06/no-aristotle-didnt 
-write-a-whole-is-greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts/ on 02-04-19.
2 The view is first stated in Plato’s Phaedo (Pl. Phd.) 98b–e, but Plato develops it extensively 
in the Theaetetus, particularly the discussion of Hesiod’s wheel at 206e4–208b9. It is worth 
noting that this is not always the case. If someone asked me to explain the things on my 
desk, it would be fine to say that they are two books, a computer, a lamp; and it is perfectly 
fine (in North America anyway) to say that a quarter is twenty-five cents. These, according 
to Aristotle, are not wholes (τὰ ὅλα), but totals (τὰ πάντα). The total / whole distinction 
first shows up, as far as I know, also in Plato’s Theaetetus (Pl. Tht.) at 204a11–b1: ‘Do you in 
fact call ‘total’ (τὸ πᾶν) and ‘whole’ (τὸ ὅλον) the same thing or something else?’ Aristotle 
takes up Plato’s distinction in Metaphysics (Arist. Metaph.) 8.6, 1045a8–12, quoted below. On 
Theaetetus, see Harte (2002), especially chapter 1.
3 For the house example, see Aristotle, De partibus animalium (Arist. Part. an.) 1.1, 639b5–30. 
See also Aristotle, Topics 6.13, 150b22–26. The extension of the analogy to natural objects is 
found in many works, but the point is made most explicitly at Aristotle, Meteorologica (Arist. 
Mete.) 4.12, 390b2–14.
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in any explanation of what those things are.4 If, like Aristotle, we think the 
parts of a thing count as its matter,5 then it is not too far off to say he thinks 
‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts.’ Some things are not identical to 
their parts alone: they are also their arrangement. As Aristotle would say, they 
are also their forms.
Now, while Aristotle never said, ‘the whole is greater than the sum of the 
parts,’ he does come close to saying it over a few pages in books 7 and 8 of 
his Metaphysics. At Metaphysics 8.6 he comes especially close. There he says 
that if something with parts is also a whole, then there must be some cause – 
some reason – that explains why those parts form a whole in the first place. 
He writes:
What is the cause (αἴτιον) of something being one? For, for everything 
that has a plurality of parts (πλείω μέρη) and the totality (τὸ πᾶν) is not 
like a heap (οἷον σωρός), but the whole (τὸ ὅλον) is something besides the 
parts (παρὰ τὰ μόρια), there is some cause, since even in the case of bod-
ies, the cause of their being one is sometimes contact, other times sticki-
ness (γλισχρότης) or some other such property.
Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6, 1045a8–126
One thing worth pointing out about this passage is that Aristotle does not say 
that the whole is greater (μεῖζον) than the sum of its parts; rather, he says that 
there are cases (presumably self-evident ones) where the whole is something 
besides (παρά) or in addition to the parts. The difference between ‘greater’ and 
‘besides’ is not merely grammatical. Aristotle, like some early Gestalt theorists, 
thinks the difference is ontological.7 Wholes are different kinds of things from 
the parts that make them up, just as syllables are different from (but not in 
any straightforward sense more than) the letters that make them up. This is 
4 ‘Hylo-’ from hylē (Aristotle’s neologism for matter) and ‘-morphism’ from morphē (or form). 
There is substantial literature on Aristotle’s hylomorphism (a word Aristotle himself never 
uses) and its more recent revivals. Good surveys of the idea and issues surrounding it can 
be found in Peramatzis (2018), and the Stanford Encyclopedia articles by Ainsworth (2016), 
Cohen (2016) and Shields (2016). For contemporary defences, see Scaltas (1994), Koslicki 
(1998, 2006, 2018), Marmodoro (2013).
5 Aristotle, Physics (Arist. Phys.) 2.3, 195a15–21; Metaph. 5.2, 1013b17–23.
6 τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι; πάντων γὰρ ὅσα πλείω μέρη ἔχει καὶ μὴ ἔστιν οἷον σωρὸς τὸ πᾶν ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι 
τὸ ὅλον παρὰ τὰ μόρια, ἔστι τι αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς μὲν ἁφὴ αἰτία τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ 
γλισχρότης ἤ τι πάθος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον. (All translations are my own unless noted otherwise.)
7 Heider (1977) 383.
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something Aristotle argues for explicitly at Metaphysics 7.17, 1041b11–42a2.8 
He believes that if we were to think that wholes are greater than their parts 
(or greater than their ‘elements’, as Aristotle refers to them here), then we run 
into a problem. If, for example, the syllable BA were greater than the sum of 
its parts, B and A, then something would need to have been added to make it 
greater. The whole, therefore, is presumably B + A + X. Now, however, we need 
something else to explain why B, A and X form a whole, and so we would need 
to posit another part to get B + A + X + Y, a process that would go on ad infin­
itum. Aristotle thinks such a regress is hopeless and so he argues that wholes 
are not created by adding something.9 Instead, there must be some other kind 
of thing (ἕτερόν τι) that makes a syllable a syllable, or a whole a whole. In the 
example of the syllable BA, this other kind of thing will be whatever it is that 
causes the elements B and A to be the syllable BA and Aristotle indicates two 
causes that fit the bill: one, the arrangement of the letter B (or the sound ‘B’) 
before the letter A (or the sound ‘A’) – what he calls the formal cause; the other, 
the person or agent who places the B before the A, what he calls the efficient 
cause. The form and the agent which causes the elements to take on that form 
are different kinds of thing altogether. The form is a cause to the parts of their 
being a whole rather than a heap; while the agent is a cause to the parts of their 
becoming a particular thing and so of the form and the matter becoming one.10
8  Arist. Metaph. 7.17, 1041b11–42a2: ‘Since what is compounded out of something in such a 
way that the totality is one, not like a heap, but like the syllable – the syllable is not the let-
ters, nor are B and A identical to BA, nor is flesh fire and earth (…); the syllable therefore 
is something, not only the letters (the vowel and the consonant), but also something else; 
and flesh is not only fire and earth or hot and cold, but also something else.’ (ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἔκ 
τινος σύνθετον οὕτως ὥστε ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, [ἂν] μὴ ὡς σωρὸς ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡ συλλαβή – ἡ δὲ συλλαβὴ 
οὐκ ἔστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, οὐδὲ τῷ « βα » ταὐτὸ τὸ « β » καὶ « α », οὐδ’ ἡ σὰρξ πῦρ καὶ γῆ (…)· ἔστιν 
ἄρα τι ἡ συλλαβή, οὐ μόνον τὰ στοιχεῖα τὸ φωνῆεν καὶ ἄφωνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι, καὶ ἡ σὰρξ 
οὐ μόνον πῦρ καὶ γῆ ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι). The passage is incorrectly 
interpreted as stating the whole is more than the sum of its parts in the translation by 
Adolf Lasson (1907) 129: ‘Das was aus Bestandteilen so zusammengesetzt ist, dass es ein 
einheitliches Ganzes bildet, nicht nach Art eines Haufens, sondern wie eine Silbe, das 
ist offenbar mehr als bloß die Summe seiner Bestandteile.’ Again, Aristotle seems to be 
taking up themes from the Theaetetus. See n. 2 above.
9  On this, see Menn (2001) 125–34. I avoid for the purposes of this paper the question – 
equally perplexing to Scotus and Ockham as to contemporary metaphysicians – of how 
matter and form, conceived as parts of the form-matter composite (the ‘hylomorphic 
compound’ or σύνολον), comprise a unified whole. On this issue, see the seminal paper by 
Ackrill (1972/3); for contemporary philosophical approaches, see Fine (1999) and (2010), 
Johnston (2006), Koslicki (2008); on Medieval approaches, e.g. Cross (1999) and Ward 
(2014); on its relevance to holism and the notion of sympathy, see Holmes in this volume.
10  Cf. Arist. Metaph. 8.6, 1045b20–23; Phys. 2.3, 194b16–32 (where they are called causes of 
generation and corruption, not being and becoming – thanks to David Ebrey for pointing 
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The account I have just sketched – or something close to it – is what peo-
ple normally have in mind when they think about Aristotle’s relationship to 
holism. Wholes are not just their parts, they are also their forms, and while we 
might think things are composed of matter and form, forms are not, at least in 
any straightforward sense, another part of a thing. Rather, they are a special 
kind of cause, which confers to the parts their being and unity. Aristotle fa-
mously refers to this kind of cause as ousia or substance. The story I wish to tell 
in the paper is about a different name he gives it: the synechon (τὸ συνέχον) – 
that which holds things together.
The idea that there is a kind of cause responsible for holding things together 
and whose weakening or dissolution brings with it disease and decay appears 
often in ancient philosophy and medicine. The cause itself goes by many differ-
ent names.11 It is, however, perhaps most commonly associated with the Stoics. 
The Stoics refer to it as the synectic cause (αἴτιον συνεκτικόν), a term variously 
translated as ‘cohesive cause,’ ‘containing cause’ or ‘sustaining cause,’ although 
none of these intuitively express in English what the Stoics meant (I will use ‘co-
hesive’). For the Stoics, the cohesive cause is a body, namely pneuma (πνεῦμα), 
a mixture of fire and air, which is active within all things as a kind of binding 
movement or force.12 Now, Galen claims that ‘the first philosophers of [his] 
this out to me). Typically, this is expressed by saying that some agent causes what is po-
tentially F (the matter) to be actually F. B and A are potentially BA, but they are also 
potentially AB or perhaps even ABBA. Aristotle thinks that the cause of the letters being 
actually BA, instead of just being able to be BA, is their substance or formal cause, while 
the cause of the letters taking on the form, of actually becoming BA, is the agent or ef-
ficient cause. While it is an understatement to say the distinction between being poten-
tially and being actually is important for Aristotle’s metaphysics, it does not have much of 
a place in the story I tell here.
11  Galen gives a good summary of synonyms for the term: ‘the cause that holds together 
[συνέχον], or the cohesive cause [συνεκτικόν], or proximate cause [προσεχές] or however 
one might wish to call it …’ (Galen, De symptomatum causis 1.5, VII.109.7–10 K.). Philip van 
der Eijk points out to me that the author of the treatise Fevers, attributed to Alexander of 
Aphrodisias (c. second century ce), uses the term ‘coupling cause’ (συνεζευγμένον αἴτιον) 
(ps.-Alexander, De febribus 27.1–12, 22,8–24,24 Tassinari). I discuss other terms in what 
follows.
12  For writers after Galen, ‘cohesive’ (συνεκτικός) comes to mean simply ‘primary,’ e.g. 
Simplicius: ‘(Aristotle) says ‘highest cause’ in the sense of ‘what is most properly (a cause),’ 
which others call ‘cohesive’ (« ἀκρότατον » μὲν λέγει « αἴτιον » τὸ κυριώτατον λεγόμενον, ὃ 
ἄλλοι συνεκτικὸν ὀνομάζουσιν)’ (Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria 
(Simpl. in Arist. Phys.) 9.326,13–21 Diels, ad Arist. Phys. 2.3, 195b21). It is important to note 
that by calling it a force, I do not imply that it is non-bodily or immaterial. For the Stoics, 
forces were bodies, insofar as anything that acts or is acted upon must, for them, be a 
body; this is not so foreign, as forces continue to be conceived of as bodies, e.g. gluons, 
photons and bosons more generally.
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acquaintance to speak of a cohesive cause were the Stoics,’ and something like 
Galen’s view of the history of the concept continues to be held today.13 The con-
sensus among scholars today is roughly that the Stoics introduce the cohesive 
cause as an active, corporeal analogue of the Aristotelian form: Aristotelian 
forms and Stoic cohesive causes explain what something is, why it acts the way 
it does and why it persists as that thing, while the Stoic innovation is to under-
stand this cause as a kind of bodily (but perhaps non-material) force binding 
things together as a whole.14 I think, however, that Galen’s claim that this is 
a Stoic innovation is potentially misleading. Once we see that Aristotle’s syn­
echon and the Stoic cohesive cause are both answers to the question, ‘what ac-
tively holds the parts of a whole together?,’ then it becomes clear that they are 
more than analogues. In fact, the Aristotelian synechon and the Stoic cohesive 
cause refer to the same thing: the nature or soul (the Stoics also add ‘cohesion’ 
(ἕξις), which is more or less an Aristotelian inanimate nature) understood as 
an internal principle of motion and rest. Aristotle believes this nature or soul 
is an immaterial yet substantial unmoved mover – an agent that always acts 
in the same way to produce the same kind of activity in the parts that make 
what it is. The Stoics believe that this (cohesion or) nature or soul is pneuma, 
an active, self-moving corporeal cause which interpenetrates and binds the 
passive material into a whole through what the Stoics call its ‘tensional move-
ment.’ The Stoics’ answer to the question ‘what holds things together’ might, 
therefore, more closely resemble Plato’s self-moving world-soul in the Timaeus 
than the unmoved souls of Aristotle’s De anima. Nevertheless, Aristotle and the 
Stoics both believe that a thing’s parts are bound together by a kind of internal, 
active cause that is not an additional part.
Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics offer refined notions of the synechon in re-
sponse to what they see as inadequacies in earlier attempts to explain how 
parts might form a whole. Their responses, however, were not the only ones 
possible. Democritus seems simply to have rejected the idea of wholes alto-
gether, suggesting they are figments of the imagination.15 Alcmaeon of Croton 
13  Galen, De causis contentivis (Gal. CC) 1.1 (52,1–2 Lyons); Adversus Iulianum 6.13 
(XVIIIA.279–80 K. = 57,15–58,6 Wenkebach); Synopsis librorum suorum de pulsibus 
(IX.458.8–14 K.). Cf. Frede (1987) 145. Susan Bobzien (1999) 228 argues (more precisely) 
that the term is a later Stoic invention and not found in Chrysippus.
14  See e.g. Frede (1987) 145; Long and Sedley (1987) 340–41; Hankinson (1998) 240–41; 
Bobzien (1999) 229. These authors all seem to rely on the same testimony of Galen. I re-
turn to this below. On cohesive causes as things other than agents, but still causes of ef-
fects, see Hankinson (1987) 81–85.
15  Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo commentaria (Simpl. in Airst. De cael.) 295,1–14 Heiberg = 
Democritus 68 A 37 DK.
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believed cohesion resulted from an equipollence of opposing powers among 
the parts, and a similar view is found in Galen’s criticism of the Stoic no-
tion of a cohesive cause. The first thinker, however, who is reported to have 
talked about something like a cohesive cause is not a Hellenistic Stoic, but the 
sixth-century bce Ionian physicist Anaximenes. After him, different candi-
dates for the synechon are proposed by different philosophers and doctors, in-
cluding Empedocles, some early Greek (i.e. Hippocratic) medical writers, and 
Diogenes of Apollonia. In what follows, I proceed by looking at these various 
thinkers’ proposals – the early Greek philosophers and doctors, and also Plato, 
Aristotle and the Stoics –, how they think they bind the parts of a thing into a 
whole and the problems these proposals raised. I think there is something im-
portant gained by examining this history, even though it means I have to leave 
aside many details and that, given the nature of some of our evidence, the 
account I give will at times be speculative. The views of the Stoics in particular 
need more careful treatment than what I can provide here (the school was 
hardly united on this issue).16 Still, I think this approach offers a productive 
way of thinking about the history of wholes, active causes and cohesion, of 
which Aristotle is a part.
2 Early Greek Philosophers and Physicians
I begin this story with the earliest accounts of bodily cohesion in Greek philos-
ophy. Many philosophers and doctors before Aristotle explain how the parts of 
something are bound together into a whole, and one of their common strate-
gies is to posit some special kind of part, a synechon (or related term), which 
holds the other parts together. The idea is intuitive. Glue, nails, fasteners, 
thread, etc., are all what we might call ‘binding parts’: bodies that hold some-
thing together, while at the same time being a part of it. Early Greek philoso-
phers posited such binding parts to explain the unity of things, from simple 
solid bodies to the cosmos itself.
A familiar example of this kind of thinking is Empedocles’ Love (Φιλότης). 
Love in Empedocles’ cosmology is a hypostatized notion of a unifier – that 
which ‘brings everything together into one’ (συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα).17 Love 
16  Frede (1987) remains the best entry point to these issues in Stoic philosophy. In this paper, 
I avoid discussions of determinism and responsibility as motivations for the Stoic theory 
of causes. I also will not be discussing Cicero’s report of Chrysippus’ causal distinctions at 
De fato 41–43, which I think raises more questions than it answers.
17  Simpl. in Arist. Phys. 9.158,7 Diels = Empedocles 31 B 17 DK. An anonymous reviewer points 
out to me that unity is not the same as holism: both Love and Strife result in wholes, either 
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works in opposition to the great cosmic ‘Strife’ (Νεῖκος), which Empedocles 
thinks is responsible for separating the cosmic elements out into different 
kinds, fire, air, water and earth. This cosmogonic requirement of difference 
and sameness, narrated as separation and unification, is already anticipated 
in early Greek mythology. In the Theogony, for example, Hesiod describes the 
birth of the cosmos as an act of divine separation: Kronos, son of Gaia (earth) 
and Ouranos (sky), separated the primordial gods by castrating Ouranos, who 
had forced himself on Gaia in perpetual sexual union, with an adamantine 
sickle. When Kronos later tossed Ouranos’ genitals into the sea, Aphrodite, 
the personification of union (Φιλότης) was born from them (Hesiod, Theogony 
190–206; on Empedocles’ identification of Love with Aphrodite, see Simpl. in 
Arist. Phys. 158,24 Diels = Emped. 31 B 17 DK). The difference for Empedocles is 
that, like other physicists of the sixth and fifth centuries, he begins to think of 
the unifier as an element: something equiprimordial, bodily and able to extend 
throughout the cosmos (Arist. Metaph. 14.4, 1091b28), and which is able to de-
termine what things are by becoming a part of them.18 Empedocles’ Love does 
this by spreading out from the centre of the cosmos to its limits, becoming in-
tegrated into the mixtures of things it unifies (Simpl. in Arist. De cael. 529,1–15 = 
Emped. 31 B 35 DK, cf. Arist. Metaph. 1.4, 985a27–28). Other thinkers posit dif-
ferent cosmogonic elements and narratives. The pattern, however, at least in 
its general details, is the same.
When the synechon, like Empedocles’ Love, is conceived of as a binding 
part, we find that it shows up at different levels of the cosmic hierarchy (in 
inanimate objects, in living things, in the cosmos as a whole); at all levels, how-
ever, binding parts share three general characteristics. First, they are conceived 
of as parts of the whole they compose; second, the whole depends on them 
in a different way than it depends on the other parts; and third, perhaps most 
important, they bring about wholeness by preventing the other parts from act-
ing according to their own impulse. In other words, to form a whole or unity, a 
by Love’s uniting all the elements into one whole, or by Strife’s uniting the elements into 
separate wholes; holism, however, arises somewhere in the middle, when the little wholes 
differentiated by Strife can work together to function as parts of a larger whole. The issue 
here is not whether Love is a synechon but whether it is the only one, since one could 
consider Strife to be what unifies the elements into separate wholes, a point already made 
by Aristotle in his criticism of Empedocles (Arist. Metaph. 1.4, 985a23–29), and who thinks 
Empedocles is confused. And it is interesting to note that, for Empedocles, cosmogony oc-
curs between the complete rules of Love or Strife, and therefore holism results from both 
causes. Love, however, is still the cause of different things being unified, and so a more 
plausible candidate for the history of the synechon I am sketching here, even if Strife is the 
cause of the parts maintaining their distinctness as parts.
18  Menn (1995) treats many related issues here. My story is guided by his study.
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binding part needs to somehow overpower the other parts in order to compel 
them to maintain their arrangement.
The first characteristic of early theories of synechon is that what holds a 
whole together is a part of that thing. In the passage from Metaphysics 8.6 
quoted earlier, Aristotle mentions stickiness (γλισχρότης) as a cause of bodily 
parts being a whole. This is not an idle example, but something Aristotle actu-
ally believes. As far as I can tell, the abstract noun ‘stickiness’ is first found in the 
writings of Aristotle and his student Theophrastus. Aristotle often, however, 
slips back into an earlier paradigm and simply calls it ‘the sticky’ (τὸ γλίσχρον). 
The difference is that ‘the sticky’ need not be an abstract entity, and Aristotle 
sometimes speaks of it as itself a part of the body (rather than as a quality 
of some part). At Generation of Animals 2.1, 737a36–b1, for instance, he em-
phasizes that ‘the sticky’ (τὸ γλίσχρον) is that which ‘holds all bodies together 
(πάντα δὲ τὰ σώματα συνέχει).’19 And in the Aristotelian Problemata 21.6, 927b6–
14, the sticky moisture within loaves of bread (τὸ ἐν αὑτοῖς γλίσχρον ὑγρόν) is 
thought to be the reason why hot loaves of bread placed next to one another 
cohere (συνέχονται) or become glued together (κολλῶνται).20 The Problemata 
comes either from the time of Aristotle or not too long after, and it too con-
tinues to conceive of some synechonta as kinds of parts. The characteristic of 
parthood can also be inferred in thinkers earlier than Aristotle. Aristotle sug-
gests that bodies that bring about cohesion were part of Empedocles’ physics, 
and he emphasizes the similarities between Empedocles’ views and his own. 
In the Meteorology, he writes, ‘the moist (τὸ ὑγρόν) is a cause to the dry of it 
being determined (ὁρίζεσθαι), and one is like a glue (κόλλα) for the other – as 
Empedocles wrote in his poem on Nature: ‘gluing meal together with water’ 
(ἄλφιτον ὕδατι κολλήσας)’ (Arist. Mete. 4.4, 381b29–82a8 = Emped. fr. 31 B 34 
DK). Empedocles is using glue as a metaphor here, but (at least according to 
Aristotle) the metaphor implies that he thinks the cohesion of a whole re-
sults from the composition of earth and water, where water is given the role 
of binding part. Aristotle agrees with Empedocles and he himself adopts this 
view in Generation and Corruption: ‘the moist is what holds it (sc. the dry) to-
gether (τὸ συνέχον).’21 The point of all this, however, is not to make a porridge. 
Empedocles and Aristotle are both saying that water or wetness is responsible 
19  πάντα δὲ τὰ σώματα συνέχει τὸ γλίσχρον. Cf. Arist. Phys. 5.3, 227a16–17, ‘and however the 
synechon happens to be one (τὸ συνέχον ἕν), in this way, too, the whole will be one, e.g. 
either by a bolt, glue, contact or adhesion’ (καὶ ὥς ποτε γίγνεται τὸ συνέχον ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ 
ὅλον ἔσται ἕν, οἷον ἢ γόμφῳ ἢ κόλλῃ ἢ ἁφῇ ἢ προσφύσει).
20  The sticky moisture is also referred to as ‘the gluey’ (τὸ κολλῶδες) in the same passage.
21  Cf. Aristotle, Generation and Corruption (Arist. Gen. corr.) 2.8, 334b30–35a3: ‘earth has no 
ability to remain together (συμμένειν) without the moist (ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγροῦ). On the contrary, 
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for the fact that solid bodies cohere, while the different proportions of water 
and earth, or wet and dry, will determine the different levels of cohesion. Too 
much fluid and a body will no longer be solid; too little fluid and the parts 
will not form a whole. There still remains the question of what determines 
these proportions. For Empedocles, it seems they are determined by a differ-
ent kind of glue, the ‘glue of Harmonia’ (‘Ἁρμονίης κόλλῃσιν ἀρηρότα,’ Simpl. in 
Arist. Phys. 300,24 Diels = Emped. fr. 31 B 96 DK), where Harmonia is, at least 
according to Simplicius, another of Empedocles’ names for Love conceived, as 
before, as something actively binding things together.22 I will come back in the 
next section to what Aristotle thinks determines these proportions. For now, it 
is enough to say that water causes the cohesion of solid bodies by becoming, 
along with earth or the dry, a part of them.
The second characteristic of the synechon conceived of as a binding part is 
that, so long as it remains present in a thing and maintains its own cohesion, 
then the whole which it causes to cohere will remain coherent. If, however, 
the synechon leaves or loses cohesion, the parts will cease to form a whole. 
This is the case with Empedocles’ cosmos, which, when Love retreats from 
that which it had been mixed with previously, results in the parts dissociat-
ing. Similarly, when wood is completely burned and the water expelled from 
it, what is left behind is uncohesive ash. Or when there is a loss of cohesion in 
the sinews that hold a joint together, then the joint loses cohesion as well and 
can no longer function – an obvious point perhaps, but worth making none-
theless. It appears often among early Greek medical writers. For instance, the 
author of Instruments of Reduction writes that, among other bones, ‘the verte-
brae are held together by sinew (σπόνδυλοι … νεύρῳ συνεχόμενοι)’ (Hippocrates, 
Leverage (Mochl.) 1, IV.342 L. = 246,9–11 Kühlewein); and the author of the sec-
ond Prorrhetics writes about lameness caused by injuries that sever the ‘sinews 
that hold the internal joints together (τὰ νεῦρα τὰ συνέχοντα)’ (Hippocrates, 
Prorrheticus II 15, IX.40 L. = 254,26–28 Potter). The idea that there are bodily 
tissues like cords that hold us together is obvious enough, and like the ear-
lier example of ‘the sticky,’ the synechon as a bodily tissue is also adopted by 
Aristotle: ‘the nature of sinew (ἡ τοῦ νεύρου φύσις) holds together the parts 
of animals (συνέχει τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων)’ (Aristotle, Generation of Animals 2.1, 
737a34–b7).23 Reflection on this aspect of the synechon may have led later 
the moist is what holds it together (τὸ συνέχον); for it (sc. earth) would fall to pieces if the 
moist were eliminated from it completely.’
22  Many thanks to Gábor Betegh for pointing me to this passage.
23  Some scholars excise this passage. The passage shares affinities with the Hippocratic work 
Fleshes: ‘that, on the other hand, which happened to be more gluey [κολλωδέστερα] and 
to contain cold, could not be burnt up on being heated or become dry, […] for this reason 
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thinkers to define cohesive causes as causes such that when they are present 
the effect is present and when they are absent the effect is absent.24 This as-
pect will become central to debates about cohesive causes in ancient medicine 
from Erasistratus (third century bce) onwards, where the notion of cohesive 
causes is extended to all causes that are contemporaneous with their effects, 
but most importantly, from a medical point of view, to causes of disease, e.g. 
that thing which is, right now, causing disease, like a kidney stone, as opposed 
to that thing which, at some earlier point in time, did something which later 
led to disease, like a bite from a dog.25 In our case, while the parts remain what 
they are even when the synechon and the whole do not exist, the existence of 
the whole requires the simultaneous existence and presence of the synechon.
The last characteristic of the synechon I want to look at is its role as a ‘pre-
venter’ (τὸ κωλῦον): something which checks or hinders the tendencies of the 
other parts that comprise the whole. Early Greek physicists believed that there 
are basic, unchanging elements that have (or just are) tendencies or powers, 
and they needed some story to tell about what it is that prevents the different 
parts from either separating out or collapsing. Clay may be a mixture of fire 
and earth, but fire tends to go up, earth to go down, and clay does not routinely 
fly apart. The sky and the earth may both be made of things that have weight 
and so tend to fall, but, at least for now, the sky has not fallen. With the prod-
ucts of human craft, one can say, e.g., that the pillars hold up the roof, or the 
glue holds the joints. Different options were offered for what serves the analo-
gous preventing or hindering function in nature.
It will take a little work to present the evidence, but at least according to 
Plato and Aristotle, one of the earliest figures to think of the synechon along 
these lines was Diogenes of Apollonia. There is some evidence that before 
Diogenes, the Ionian physicist Anaximenes did so as well. Some sources re-
port that Anaximenes argued that, as our soul is a kind of air that holds us 
together (συγκρατεῖ), so there also exists some kind of pneuma or air that 
it took a form rather different […] and became cords and vessels [νεῦρα καὶ φλέβες]’ 
(Hippocrates, De carnibus (Hipp. Carn.) 3, VIII.586 L. = 134.6–18 Potter, tr. Potter, mod-
ified). Aristotle, too, thinks the vessels hold the body together. See Arist. Part. an. 3.6, 
668b20–27. The shell is the analogue of cords and vessels in non-blooded animals. See 
Arist. Part. an. 2.8, 654a3–8.
24  On this, see Frede (1987) 146–47, Bobzien (1999), and the excellent discussions in 
Hankinson (1998) 376–79 and Havrda (2016) 262–73, 306.
25  For the debate, see Gal. CC 2.1 (55,6–11 Lyons); Adversus Iulianum 6.13 (XVIIIA.279–80 K. = 
57,15–58,6 Wenkebach). For examples, see Ps.-Galen, Introductio sive Medicus ([Gal.] 
Int.) 8 (XIV.691–92 K. = 16,9–24 Petit); ps.-Galen, Definitiones medicae ([Gal.] Def.) 157; 
XIX.392–93 K.; Sextus, Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes (S. E. PH) 3.15; Clement, Stromata 8.33.1–7 
(101,16–102,16 Havrda).
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encompasses (περιέχει) the cosmos as a whole (ὅλον τὸν κόσμον) (Ps.-Plutarch, 
Placita, 876a10–12 = Anaximenes 13 B 2 DK).26 If this fragment is authentic, 
then it is the earliest explicit reference to the soul being that which holds the 
body together, as opposed to some other part like sinews or bones. It is also 
one of the first places where we find parallel cohesive entities mentioned at 
micro- and macrocosmic levels. Yet the authenticity of the fragment is at best 
dubious; instead, the earliest point at which we can reliably say the synechon 
becomes an object of philosophical reflection is in response to the works of 
Diogenes of Apollonia.
Diogenes is an eclectic thinker, who combines ideas from Anaximenes, 
Heraclitus, Anaxagoras and Leucippus. He attempts to update the theories of 
an earlier generation, which posited a single material principle from which 
everything arose, and he is especially fond of Anaximenes, agreeing with him 
that everything in the cosmos derives from air and is moved by air and that our 
soul, which animates us and moves us, is also a portion of cosmic air contained 
within our body. He combines this old-fashioned view with the new physics 
of Anaxagoras, who posited a special kind of stuff called reason (νοῦς), which 
he thinks permeates all things and is responsible for moving the other bodies 
in a rational way to form a cosmos. Anaxagoras believed that νοῦς, which is 
‘the absolute ruler (αὐτοκρατές)’, must be ‘unmixed with any of the other stuff 
(μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι)’ of the cosmos, for if it were mixed, ‘it would be hin-
dered … so that it could not rule any of the stuff (μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν) as it 
now does being alone by itself ’ (Simpl. in Arist. Phys. 156,13–15 = Anaxagoras 48 
B 12 DK). Diogenes agrees with Anaxagoras that the fact that the cosmos is 
intelligible and well-ordered needs to be explained by proposing a rational 
cause of order – and what better cause of rational order than hypostatized rea-
son itself? He thinks, however, that reason is not independent of all the other 
stuff, but is instead to be identified with air, which he thinks possesses thinking 
(νοήσις). The air, therefore, is the source of movement in the cosmos, while its 
thought is the source of the order of that movement.27 We can speculate that 
26  There is a great deal of uncertainty both about the reliability and the interpretation of this 
fragment. Kirk et al. (1999) 159–61 claim the form συγκρατεῖ is impossible in the sixth cen-
tury. They are likely correct. A search of the TLG shows no use before the late Hellenistic 
period. Their suggestion that it is a combination of συνέχειν and κρατεῖν is plausible. It is 
possibly Stoic: see its uses at [Plut.] Plac. 14, 907a8 and [Gal.] Def. 96, XIX.372 K., the latter 
in which συνέχειν and συγκρατεῖν are treated synonymously. πνεῦμα and κόσμον are also 
unlikely in Anaximenes’ time. On this, see also Vlastos (1955) 363–64 and n. 56.
27  This account broadly follows Menn (1995). Cf. Simpl. in Arist. Phys. 152,13–22 = Diogenes 64 
B 3–4 DK. Intelligence is attributed to air by the author of The Sacred Disease, but whether 
the author identifies them is unclear to me. See e.g. Hippocrates, De morbo sacro 19 
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Diogenes believes the advantage of this kind of account is that rationality in 
us and the cosmos, as well as life and movement, are explained by the same 
entity.
In a fragment from his On Nature preserved by Simplicius, Diogenes writes 
that air:
is great, strong (ἰσχυρόν), eternal (ἀΐδιον) and immortal (ἀθάνατον) and 
knows many things (πολλὰ εἰδός).
Simpl. in Arist. Phys. 153,21–2 = Diogenes of Apollonia 64 B 8 DK
What Diogenes means by claiming air is strong (ἰσχυρόν) is not immediately 
clear from the fragment, but parallels of this fragment in Plato and Aristotle can 
at least tell us how they understood him. For Plato and Aristotle, the strength 
of air refers to its role as a synechon, and they took Diogenes to be saying that it 
exercised its role as a synechon by hindering the impulses of other bodies. The 
first passage is in Plato’s Phaedo, and although Diogenes is not named, the sim-
ilarity to the fragment above is suggestive of the fact that Plato has Diogenes’ 
On Nature in mind. He writes that the physicists
believe they will one day discover an Atlas that is stronger (ἰσχυρότερον), 
more immortal (ἀθανατώτερον) and better able to hold everything to-
gether (συνέχοντα) than this (sc. the Good); and they think that that 
which is truly good and binding (τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον) doesn’t bind (συνδεῖν) 
and hold together (συνέχειν) anything.
Plato, Phaedo 99c2–628
If this is a representation of Diogenes’ views, then Plato thinks that Diogenes 
is talking about the synechon in On Nature. Plato goes so far as to call the syne­
chon Atlas: a Titan strong enough to hold the cosmos together.29
(VI.390 L.). The author of the Hippocratic Fleshes, however, attributes almost an identical 
set of properties to ‘heat’ (τὸ θερμόν) at Hipp. Carn. 2 (VIII.584 L.).
28  τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν 
οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον 
καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον 
συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται.
29  Why the Titan Atlas? David Ebrey suggests to me that Plato may be contrasting the 
earth-born Titan with notions of Olympian divinity. It is possible, moreover, that some 
physicist used Atlas illustratively, but we do not know which one. See next passage. Also 
similar is the Hippocratic Breaths: Hippocrates, De flatibus 4 (VI.96 L. = 93,18–19 Heiberg) 
and 15 (VI.114 L. = 101,16–23 Heiberg). On Diogenes as a common source for both Plato and 
the author of Breaths, see Menn (1995) 39–41.
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The second parallel is from Aristotle’s Metaphysics 5.23, and this passage 
makes the connection between the synechon and the ‘preventer’ explicit. 
Aristotle writes:
That which prevents (τὸ κωλῦον) something from moving or acting in ac-
cordance with its own impulse is said ‘to hold it’ (ἔχειν), as e.g. pillars 
‘hold’ (ἔχειν) the weights lying upon them and as the poets make Atlas 
‘hold’ (ἔχειν) the sky, since it would fall upon the earth, just as some of the 
physicists also say. In this way what holds together (τὸ συνέχον) is said to 
hold (ἔχειν) what it holds together (συνέχει), since each would separate in 
accordance with their own impulse.
Arist. Metaph. 5.23, 1023a17–2330
According to Aristotle, one way of understanding the synechon is as that which 
prevents (τὸ κωλῦον) the parts from acting according to their own impulses. 
The sky, for instance, left to its own impulses, would fall to the earth;31 but, as 
long as it is held up by Atlas and as long as Atlas can overpower the tendency 
of the sky to fall, the cosmos will be sustained.32 In the same way, the synechon 
prevents the parts of a thing from separating out. The assumption, then, is that 
the parts of things have impulses, which on their own would lead them to sep-
arate out; since wholes exist, those impulses must somehow be restrained. The 
synechon is the name given to whatever it is that does this.
3 Plato
The model of the synechon of the early Greek physicists is, we might say, ty­
rannical, at least as it is understood by Plato and Aristotle. The synechon is a 
distinct kind of part which holds things together, what I have called a binding 
30  ἔτι τὸ κωλῦον κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν τι κινεῖσθαι ἢ πράττειν ἔχειν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, οἷον 
καὶ οἱ κίονες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν Ἄτλαντα ποιοῦσι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχειν ὡς 
συμπεσόντ’ ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φυσιολόγων τινές φασιν· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ 
συνέχον λέγεται ἃ συνέχει ἔχειν, ὡς διαχωρισθέντα ἂν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμὴν ἕκαστον.
31  Diogenes is reported to think it sometimes does fall as meteorites. See Aetius Placita 
2.13.15 and 9 = no. 608 Kirk et al. (1999) 445.
32  One might object that Atlas is clearly keeping things apart, rather than holding them 
together, and the variation between Plato’s and Aristotle’s terminology, where Plato says 
that Atlas ‘holds together’ (συνέχειν) all things, while Aristotle says that it ‘holds’ (ἔχειν), 
suggests the terminology was not settled. The general agreement, however, is that the 
synechon holds things together by being stronger than the things it holds together and 
restraining the parts that make up the whole.
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part, and it does this by overpowering the tendencies or impulses of the other 
parts.33 A whole is made up of competing forces, subdued by the strength of a 
dominant force, compelling and forcing them to unite as one.
The tyrannical model of the synechon we find in Diogenes is adopted and re-
fined by both Plato and Aristotle (I will turn to Aristotle in the next section). In 
the passage from the Phaedo above, Plato complains that they ‘think that that 
which is truly good and binding (τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον) does not bind (συνδεῖν) 
and hold together (συνέχειν) anything.’ Plato agrees with Diogenes (and 
Anaxagoras, Empedocles and the others), that intelligence or the good should 
be that which holds the cosmos together, but he thinks this needs a different 
kind of model of cohesion, one that does not unite parts into a whole merely 
through force and compulsion, but under a common virtue or good. Plato has 
Socrates make a similar point in the Gorgias: ‘the wise say that fellowship and 
friendship, orderliness, self-control and justice hold together (συνέχειν) the 
heaven and earth, gods and men, and because of these things, my friend, they 
call this whole (τὸ ὅλον) a cosmos (κόσμος) and not unarranged (ἀκοσμία) or 
uncontrolled (ἀκολασία)’ (Plato, Gorgias, 507e6–8a4).34 At this level of abstrac-
tion, the point is not idle. If the parts of a whole share a unity of purpose, such 
that they are directed towards achieving one good, then Plato thinks such an 
entity has a better claim to being a whole than if it were merely assembled by 
force.
Why Plato thinks this is not entirely clear, but there have been some sug-
gestions. In an article on Socrates’ objections to the earlier physicists in the 
Phaedo, Stephen Menn points out that one thing Plato might be criticizing 
is the failure of materialist accounts like Diogenes’ to explain why things are 
33  So, in Euripides, Supplices 311–14:
   … and all those who confuse the customs of Hellas,
   stop. For what holds together (τὸ συνέχον) the cities of men
   is this: when someone rightly preserves (σῴζῃ) the laws.
  Alexander of Aphrodisias thinks Aristotle was trying to avoid this implication, claiming 
the difference between the way a tyrant ‘holds’ a city and the synechon ‘holds’ a whole, 
is that a tyrant imposes his impulse on things, while the synechon prevents other things 
from acting according to their impulse (Alexander, In Aristotelis Metaphysica commen­
taria 421,17–21 Hayduck).
34  φασὶ δ’ οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν 
συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ 
ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. Xenophon’s Socrates also 
discusses ‘the one who coordinates and holds together the whole cosmos (ὁ τὸν ὅλον 
κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων)’ as a cause of everything beautiful and good (πάντα καλὰ 
καὶ ἀγαθά) (Xenophon, Memorabilia, 4.3.13).
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wholes at all.35 A mass of things held together by compulsion may have spatial 
contiguity, but this would not be enough to get us substantial or conceptual 
unity, since it leaves unexplained the most important fact about it: that it is 
a whole, a single subject, with parts that have the arrangement, or cosmos, 
they have. To explain that there is a single thing, we need a different kind of 
synechon, something unlike air or the other kinds of material things which the 
tyrannical model assumes.
In addition to this conceptual problem, Plato may also believe that it is 
implausible to consider the kinds of things Diogenes or Anaxagoras posit to 
be sources of orderly, rational movement in other things. Plato believes, and 
thinks his interlocutors believe as well, that all perceptible things share one 
feature: water, earth, even Diogenes’ air, Anaxagoras’ Reason, or Empedocles’ 
Love, move by contact: by moving and being moved by other things.36 This 
may be why Plato says the physicists are looking for an Atlas stronger than 
the bodies it compels and also why he thinks these projects are bound to fail. 
If bodies move by being moved, then when Atlas pushes up against the sky to 
hold it, the sky will push back against him. For Plato, however, such an arrange-
ment is implausible: no matter how rational Atlas is, as long as he is a body, he 
will be moved by the things he is moving contrary to his reason. Given a long 
enough time, perhaps the cosmos might descend into disorder,37 or perhaps 
this is too impious a position to attribute to a divine cause of order. But what-
ever Plato’s precise reason, the cosmos is not disorderly, and so he thinks what 
holds the cosmos together must be an even more absolute ruler than Diogenes’ 
tyrant, one which can hold the cosmos together without its authority being 
threatened. To do this, it needs to be a different kind of thing altogether, some 
entity that can bring about an effect in the parts and preserve the whole they 
compose, without itself being subject to change from the things it is acting 
upon.
To conclude this section, I think it is useful to compare Plato’s revision of 
Diogenes’ tyrannical model (we can call it the monarchic model) with a still 
earlier one, which appeals to another political metaphor – that of equality or 
isonomia. Its most famous proponent is Alcmaeon of Croton, who (at least ac-
cording to the report) claimed, ‘what is cohesive of health is the equality of 
powers’ (τῆς μὲν ὑγιείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν <τὴν> ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων), while, 
of diseases and corruption more generally, ‘the agent is a monarchy among 
35  Menn (2010) 53–61.
36  Plato develops these themes further in Timaeus 52a–e and Laws X 893b–99d.
37  Menn (1995) 41. This study continues to serve as a foundational introduction to Plato’s 
critique and refinement of early Greek physics.
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them, since monarchy is each thing’s agent of destruction’ (τὴν δ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς 
μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικήν· φθοροποιὸν γὰρ ἑκατέρου μοναρχίαν) ([Plutarch], 
Placita philosophorum 30, 911a2–9 = Alcmaeon 14 B 4 DK). As Gregory Vlastos 
points out in ‘Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies,’ for many early 
Greek physicists and physicians, including Alcmaeon, ‘the order of nature is 
maintained because it is an order of equals.’38 Rather than assuming there is 
one body or force which compels unity on parts to form a whole, this model 
assumes that cohesion is something that emerges from an equality or equipol-
lence among opposing bodily forces. The same model of equality is found in 
some Hippocratic writers, who see the equal mixture (κρᾶσις) of the powers 
in the body (e.g. hot cold moist dry) to be equivalent to health. It is also found 
in Plato’s Phaedo as the view proposed by Simmias, who claims ‘our body is as 
it were made taut (ἐντεταμένον) and held together (συνεχόμενον) by hot, cold, 
dry, wet, and things like them, and our soul is a mixture (κρᾶσις) and harmonia 
or attunement (ἁρμονία) of those same things’ (Pl. Phd. 86b7–c1).39 The fact 
that the isonomia/mixture model is put forward by Simmias, with his apparent 
ties to Pythagoreanism, suggests the model may also be at work in theories 
in which the soul is conceived of as a harmonia, where the harmonia liter-
ally is the mixture or attunement of the constituent elements.40 The author of 
the text attributed to Alcmaeon in the Placita, of course, is himself stretching 
when he writes that Alcmaeon calls isonomia ‘cohesive’ of health and monar-
chy its agent of destruction. Alcmaeon almost certainly did not use the term 
‘συνεκτικήν’ for ‘cohesive’, which in this quotation has its later, Hellenistic sense 
of a cause such that when it is present the effect is present. The author’s inter-
pretation nevertheless highlights what Alcmaeon and Simmias are suggesting, 
namely that coherence and unity emerge from an equipollence of opposing 
parts.
The idea that cohesion arises from an equality of opposing forces is about 
as far as one can get from Diogenes’ tyrannical model of the synechon of liv-
ing bodies and of the cosmos as a whole. Nevertheless, mixture (κρᾶσις), or 
an equality of forces, remained a productive way of understanding material 
composition and cohesion. The physician Galen will go so far as to write a trea-
tise in this tradition, That the Qualities of the Soul follow the Mixtures of the 
Body (QAM), which sets out to prove that the qualities of the soul depend on, 
and so emerge from, the mixture of elements in the body, thus suggesting that 
38  Vlastos (1996) 58–61.
39  I am grateful to Gábor Betegh and David Ebrey for suggesting a connection with Simmias’ 
claims in the Phaedo.
40  On Simmias’ Pythagoreanism, see Sedley (1995).
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the body is what holds the soul together, rather than the other way around.41 
Aristotle, however, took a different approach to the notion of mixture. He sup-
posed, like Plato, that bodies cannot be causes of their own cohesion. This role 
must be filled by something else, some cause that is not another part, which 
Aristotle called nature or soul.
4 Aristotle
So far, I have claimed that the synechon of Plato’s and Aristotle’s predecessors 
share three characteristics, which I call the ‘tyrannical’ model of cohesion. The 
first is that the synechon is a part of what it holds together, what I call a bind-
ing part. The second, that the whole it holds together only exists so long as 
the synechon exists. And the third is that the synechon holds parts together by 
hindering the impulses of those parts. I have also argued that Plato criticized 
and refined two of these characteristics. Against the first characteristic, Plato 
argues that, at least at the level of living things and the cosmos as a whole, the 
synechon cannot be another part of the whole the same as other bodily parts. If 
it were, it would end up being jostled around too much by the things it is trying 
to hold together to plausibly maintain the order and integrity of the cosmos 
we observe.42 Against the third characteristic, Plato argues that the synechon, 
if it is to produce a whole, cannot merely be what hinders the impulses of the 
parts, but also needs to be what directs those impulses towards a common 
purpose. This may involve tempering or hindering the individual impulses, but 
what unifies them into a whole is not merely their being forced into some kind 
of contiguity, but the purpose to which they are being aimed.
I have also shown that at the bodily level, Aristotle continues to use the 
tyrannical model of cohesion presented by his predecessors. He thinks the 
41  Galen, QAM (IV.767–822 K. = 32,1–79,24 Müller). I cannot here do justice to the complex-
ities around theories of mixture and their rise in Hellenistic and later thought. For an 
overview, see Singer et al. (2018) 1–46; and Mirrione (2017).
42  Plato does often talk about the soul in ways that make it seem similar to perceptible bod-
ies, e.g. especially in the Timaeus, where he says it is something spatially extended and 
jostled around by the bodies it inhabits. As David Ebrey points out to me, this might imply 
souls as synechonta are subject to the same criticism – and this may be true, and perhaps 
even desired, since living things, unlike the cosmos, are not immortal, which they would 
be if what held them together could never be weakened. Plato needs to give other argu-
ments in the Timaeus to explain why the cosmos is immortal, namely because there are 
no bodies outside of it which might impede its activity by acting on it from without. See 
Pl. Ti. 32c–34b.
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cohesion of things like chairs or animal bodies can be explained by the pres-
ence of binding parts like glue, rivets or sinews. At the same time, he agrees 
with Plato that if a whole is to be a true unity, then there needs to be some 
cause that unifies the parts more than spatially or by contact. There needs to 
be a unity of purpose, what Plato calls the good and Aristotle ‘that for the sake 
of which’ something exists. In this section, I want to focus on another model of 
bodily coherence which Aristotle uses to illustrate this kind of cause, namely 
the arts.
There are three passages in Aristotle’s De anima where he addresses the 
question, what is it that actively holds the parts of the body together? In these 
passages, Aristotle uses the characteristics of the synechon accepted by his 
predecessors, including Plato, to argue for a different model of the synechon 
that is not based on the relation of a tyrant to what it rules or on an equipol-
lence among opposing powers, but on the relation of an art to its instruments 
or organs.
In the first passage, Aristotle uses the argument from the Phaedo to show 
that the soul cannot be made up of several different elements, in other words, 
that the soul cannot arise, like health does for Alcmaeon, from several different 
elements combining.
Someone might also raise the problem: (if the soul is composed of dif-
ferent elements), what is it that makes them one (τὸ ἑνοποιοῦν)? For the 
elements, at any rate, look like matter, while the synechon – whatever it 
is – is most powerful. But it is impossible for anything to be stronger than 
and rule over (κρεῖττον καὶ ἄρχον) the soul, even more impossible (for 
something to rule over) reason.
Arist. De an. 1.5, 410b10–1443
This argument is similar to the ones from Diogenes and Plato we met ear-
lier, but Aristotle is extending those arguments from macro- to microcosm. 
Whatever the synechon is, whether it is a body or an immaterial substance or 
something else, it must be ‘the most powerful,’ i.e., more powerful than any 
of the things it is meant to hold together. Otherwise, it would not be able to 
hinder the impulses of the things it binds. And Aristotle, following the Phaedo, 
will argue that this means the synechon cannot be material: matter can always 
be moved, because it is always just as strong as any other matter. The synechon 
43  ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις καὶ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἑνοποιοῦν αὐτά· ὕλῃ γὰρ ἔοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα, κυριώτατον 
δ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ συνέχον, ὅ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναί τι κρεῖττον καὶ ἄρχον ἀδύνατον· 
ἀδυνατώτερον δ’ ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ.
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must instead be something that cannot be moved, at least by the things it 
binds, and so must be something immaterial, i.e. soul or reason.
Aristotle then turns to a slightly different question, namely what holds the 
parts of the soul together. This argument appeals to the second characteristic 
of the synechon, that the whole exists only so long as the synechon exists and 
is present in it. Aristotle uses it against an opponent who thinks the soul is 
naturally divided (μεριστὴ πέφυκεν), asking what it is that holds the divided 
soul together (συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν). Aristotle argues that it is ‘surely not the 
body,’ since the opposite is obvious, namely that the soul ‘holds (συνέχειν) the 
body together, since the body evaporates and putrefies when it departs’ (Arist. 
De an. 1.5, 411b6–9).44 Aristotle’s target here is almost certainly Plato. In the 
discussion of different kinds of soul at Timaeus 69c–73d, Plato has the lesser 
gods construct and localize the mortal kinds of soul in different regions of the 
body. When he goes on to explain how the different kinds of soul are bound 
together, including the immortal soul, he explains it by their common bond 
to the body: the god ‘bound the kinds of souls together by implanting them 
in the marrow (φυτεύων ἐν αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ μυελῷ] κατέδει τὰ τῶν ψυχῶν γένη)’ 
(Pl. Ti. 73c3–4).45 Aristotle thinks this explanation cannot succeed. Even if only 
the immortal, i.e. intellectual, soul departs at death, the body nevertheless rots, 
and this implies that the other souls (or parts of soul) have departed as well. 
These souls must, therefore, form a whole and not merely because they are 
present in the same body.
The third passage contains Aristotle’s own solution to the problem of the 
synechon of the body. Aristotle has been discussing Empedocles’ explanation 
of why the roots of plants grow down and their tops grow up (answer: earth 
naturally tends to go down, fire tends to go up, and the growth of the plant 
spreads along this axis). After some initial criticisms, Aristotle asks:
What is the thing that holds together (τὸ συνέχον) fire and earth, which 
tend to move in opposite directions? For they will be pulled apart if there 
is nothing preventing it (τὸ κωλῦον). But if there is, then this is the soul and 
the cause of nutrition and growth. Some people think the nature of fire is 
the cause of nutrition and growth, especially since it is the only body that 
seems to be fed and to grow, and for this reason someone might assume, 
in the case of animals and plants too, this is the agent (τὸ ἐργαζόμενον). 
Although it is somehow the contributing cause (τὸ συναίτιον), surely the 
44  τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ 
τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται.
45  Thanks to Gábor Betegh for pointing me to this passage.
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cause (τὸ αἴτιον) strictly speaking is not (fire), but rather the soul: for fire’s 
growth is unlimited as long as there is something to burn, while of things 
composed by nature, there is a limit and proportion of both size and 
growth. These belong to soul rather than fire and to reason (λόγος) rather 
than matter.
Arist. De an. 2.4, 416a6–1846
Aristotle begins this passage by appealing to the synechon’s role as that which 
prevents the parts from separating according to their own impulses. The target 
is Empedocles and his attempt to explain the growth of plants according to the 
elements (the parts) that make them up. Aristotle’s point is that Empedocles’ 
strategy of trying to explain the activities of a whole in terms of the activities 
of the parts is hopeless, especially since those parts have opposing impulses, 
which, rather than leading to a complex activity and arrangement, as we in 
fact find, should simply lead to the plant being torn apart. Aristotle does not 
want to deny that the powers of the elements have a role in the growth and 
maintenance of a living thing; but he wants to reconsider what that role is in 
light of the fact that the elements cannot explain the arrangement and limit 
of a thing’s growth. So, Aristotle calls fire in this case a co-cause (τὸ συναίτιον), 
while he reserves the term cause (τὸ αἴτιον) for the soul, since the soul is prop-
erly speaking the agent (τὸ ἐργαζόμενον) acting in accordance with a rational 
principle (λόγος), rather than a chaotic one. But what is the relationship be-
tween the two?
Aristotle appeals to a different model of the synechon from that of a tyrant 
or monarch, opting instead for a model based on the arts. In broad strokes, 
Aristotle thinks that, among living things, what makes them wholes is not a 
specific material part, but the soul, which actively holds the parts of the body 
together. The soul does this not by constraint or force, but by producing and 
maintaining the various parts of the body through nutrition and growth, an 
activity which uses the body and its components as instruments or organs (in 
Greek, τὰ ὄργανα). What guarantees the cohesion of the body in this instance 
is the fact that the body is a prerequisite for the soul to do whatever else it does 
46  πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τἀναντία φερόμενα τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν; διασπασθήσεται 
γάρ, εἰ μή τι ἔσται τὸ κωλύον· εἰ δ’ ἔσται, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ 
τρέφεσθαι. δοκεῖ δέ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἁπλῶς αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι· καὶ 
γὰρ αὐτὸ φαίνεται μόνον τῶν σωμάτων [ἢ τῶν στοιχείων] τρεφόμενον καὶ αὐξόμενον, διὸ καὶ ἐν 
τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον. τὸ δὲ συναίτιον μέν πώς 
ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν ἁπλῶς γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πυρὸς αὔξησις εἰς ἄπειρον, 
ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ καυστόν, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἔστι πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ 
αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, ἀλλ’ οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης.
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(reproduce, perceive, think). So long as the soul is present in the body, it will 
actively maintain the arrangement of the body in order that the body contin-
ues to serve as its instrument.
Aristotle does not use this model to suggest that the soul is like an artist 
using instruments; rather, he seems to be thinking of the soul like an art using 
its instruments.47 The muses may always need a poet, but nature needs no such 
medium – it can act immediately through bodies. This leads Aristotle to make 
some bizarre-sounding claims. He says things like, ‘if the art of ship-building 
were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature’ (Arist. Phys. 2.8, 
199b28–29), i.e. the wood would turn itself into a ship. There is also a thought 
experiment about an axe as a natural body (φυσικὸν σῶμα), something like 
a cybernetic hatchet, whose soul is the capacity to cut things (ἡ δύναμις τοῦ 
ὀργάνου) and whose activity is to get up and cut things on its own, no carpen-
ter required (Arist. De an. 2.1, 412b10–13a10). In the world of human craft, an 
artist is a necessary intermediary between the art and the instruments or or-
gans through which it acts; nature, however, needs no intermediary. It operates 
like a doctor who cures herself (ὅταν τις ἰατρεύῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν) (Arist. Phys. 2.8, 
199b31).
That is not to say that outside influences cannot act on the body and 
threaten its cohesion. The soul may be unaffected or unmoved by the body 
when it acts, since ‘like, the art of medicine … when it produces health, it is 
in no way affected by the patient who is being healed’ (Arist. Gen. Corr. 1.7, 
324a35–b1).48 Nevertheless, the matter, i.e. the body, like food or a drug acting 
as instruments of the agent, is always affected when it carries out the soul’s 
activities: ‘the food, when it produces (health), is also affected in some way: for it 
is heated or cooled or otherwise affected at the same time as it acts’ (Arist. Gen. 
Corr. 1.7, 324b1–3). Over time, the body, like a blunted instrument, will become 
incapable of carrying out the activities of the soul, including the activity of 
maintaining its own cohesion.49
47  Menn (2002) 95.
48  Cf. Arist. De an. 3.5, 430a17–19 ‘for reason (ὁ νοῦς) is separate, unaffected and unmixed, 
being substance in actuality. For the agent is always more honourable than the patient, 
and the principle than the matter.’ On the Gen. Corr. passage and its relevance, see Menn 
(2002) 95–99; Falcon (2005) 25.
49  Menn (2002) 113.
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5 The Stoics, Pneumatists and Galen
The history of the synechon or cohesive cause which I have been tracing leads 
in the end to the more familiar Stoic notion. The Stoic position on cohesive 
causes resembles something like an eclectic mix of Diogenes of Apollonia and 
Aristotle. A comparatively large amount of literature exists on the Stoic the-
ory of cohesive causes, at least much more than on earlier theories.50 Rather 
than rehearse this literature, I want to conclude by noting a few aspects of the 
Stoic notion of cohesive causes that seem to me most closely related to this 
earlier tradition.
The first is perhaps trivial, but worth mentioning. It is often said that the 
Stoic cohesive cause is an analogue to the Aristotelian form,51 but speaking this 
way tends to obscure how similar the causal role of the Stoic cohesive cause 
and its Aristotelian equivalents are, whether that equivalent is soul, nature or 
the notion of actuality more generally – whatever that metaphysical item is 
which is the immaterial cause to the matter of its having the kind of activity it 
has: the force, so to speak, existing in the matter, as soul is the cause to a body 
of its being actually a living body. We may not think of ‘being a living body’ as a 
kind of activity, but for Aristotle, being alive or being anything else is to exist in 
actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), which is for him a kind of activity without movement. The 
Stoic view is remarkably close to this except, because they believe only bod-
ies can be causes, they deny there are activities without movement. They do, 
however, maintain a distinction between the cause and the matter and, as does 
Aristotle, they believe the cause acts to confer cohesion to the matter. Galen 
gives the most complete summary of their view in his work on Cohesive Causes:
The first philosophers of my acquaintance to speak of a cohesive cause 
were the Stoics. Their view is that from the four elements are produced 
those bodies that Aristotle calls homoiomerous and that are described by 
Plato as ‘the first to be generated,’ while all other bodies are simply com-
pounds of these. Of the elements themselves, some they call material and 
some active and dynamic. They maintain that the material elements are 
held together by those that are dynamic, fire and air being dynamic and 
active in their view, while earth and water are material. They say that, 
when the elements are intermingled, the dynamic wholly penetrate the 
material, that is to say, air and fire penetrate water and earth. Air is cold 
50  See especially Frede (1987), Hankinson (1998), Bobzien (1999), and papers in Coughlin, 
Leith and Lewis (2020).
51  See n. 14 above.
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and fire is hot. The natural effect of air is to consolidate and thicken a 
substance, whereas fire naturally causes expansion, loosening and wid-
ening. The two active elements have fine parts and the other two thick 
parts. Every substance with fine parts the Stoics call spirit (sc. pneuma), 
and they think that the function of this spirit is to produce cohesion in 
natural and in animal bodies. By natural bodies I mean those that are pro-
duced by nature and not by human skill, like stones, gold, wood and those 
parts of the animal body that are called the primary and homoiomerous 
parts, that is, nerves, arteries, veins, cartilages, bones and everything else 
of the same sort. Men join bits of wood together with glue, nails, pegs, 
clay, gypsum and lime. Similarly nature is found connecting all the parts 
of the body so as to form a united whole by means of cartilage, ligaments 
and tendons. If you like, you can call the parts of the body that produce 
this union in the simple members cohesive causes of the compounds, 
and the same term can be applied to clay, gypsum, lime and the other 
things that serve the same purpose in externals which are connected by 
the skill of man and not by nature. It is not these, however, but rather 
material substance with fine parts that the Stoics call a cohesive cause.
Gal. CC 1.1–5, 53,2–55,3 Lyons, trans. Lyons52
Galen’s summary, that pneuma (a mixture of fire and air) is the active element 
and brings about cohesion in the material elements, earth and water, by pro-
ducing a two-fold movement outward and inward, is echoed in numerous 
other ancient sources.53 Sextus Empiricus tells us that the Stoics also called 
‘what holds together (τὸ συνέχον) the whole compound’ the soul.54 Galen’s 
other claim that things, like glue and nails, ligaments and tendons, can be 
called synechon, echoes the earlier use of the term, where it meant a binding 
part, as opposed to an active cause.55 Galen himself rejects the Stoic cohesive 
52  cf. Galen, De plenitudine liber 3 (VII.525 K.) ‘… most of those who propose the cohesive ca-
pacity (τὴν συνεκτικὴν δύναμιν), like the Stoics, make what holds together (τὸ συνέχον) one 
thing and what is held together (τὸ συνεχόμενον) another. For the pneumatic substance 
(τὴν πνευματικὴν οὐσίαν) is what holds together, while the material (substance) (τὴν ὑλικὴν 
οὐσίαν) is what is held together, which is why they say air and fire hold together, but earth 
and water are held together.’
53  [Gal.] Def. 96, XIX.372.1–2 K.; Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 43, 1053f3–7.
54  Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.234.2–4 ‘[Some Stoics] assert soul is said in 
two ways: what holds the whole compound together [τό τε συνέχον τὴν ὅλην σύγκρισιν], 
and the leading part [τὸ ἡγεμονικόν] on its own.’
55   It is used in a similar way in Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales 8.10, 735e5–f2, where the loss 
of leaves in autumn is explained in terms of the mixture (κρᾶσις) no longer being able to 
preserve them because what is glutinous and cohesive (τὸ ἐχέκολλον καὶ συνεκτικόν) no 
longer remains in it.
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cause altogether in his work On Cohesive Causes, arguing that either (a) every 
whole needs a cohesive cause, in which case pneuma will also need a cohesive 
cause and we get a regress; or (b) some things need cohesive causes, while 
others are self-cohesive, in which case Galen thinks a much better case could 
be made for something like adamantine to be self-cohesive than hot air, since 
things like adamantine are solid and less prone to disperse (Gal. CC 6.2–5, 
61,26–63,16 Lyons).
One of the most remarkable differences between the Aristotelian and Stoic 
notion of the cohesive cause, however, is what it says about us, or at any rate 
about how we fall apart. Atlas may be strong and eternal, but our cohesion is 
limited. Aristotle blames the instrument. The Stoics also blame the soul – at 
least, the Stoic-influenced Pneumatist physician,56 Athenaeus of Attalia sees 
the source of incoherence in the powers of the soul itself:
Old age requires a more exact regimen and additional aids. For the psy-
chic and physical capacities (ψυχικαί τε καὶ φυσικαὶ δυνάμεις) which hold 
us together and preserve us (συνέχουσαι καὶ διασῴζουσαι ἡμᾶς) lose their 
strength, their functions are brought to an end and the body wrinkles 
and becomes malnourished, loose and dry. And so when the capacity 
which keeps the body upright (ἡ μὲν διευθύνουσα τὸ σῶμα δύναμις), offers 
resistance against external things that cause us injury, and resists in ac-
cordance with certain spermatic principles (σπερματικοὺς λόγους) and 
natural necessities (φυσικὰς ἀνάγκας), falls to the floor (ὑπὸ πόδας χωρῇ, 
i.e. declines in strength), the body is easily affected and easily injured, 
requiring but a small cause and chance influence for harm. At the start, 
then, from an early age, one should also take precautions for the time of 
old age. For as those who wear out their cloak in the summer spend the 
winter in tatters, so those who in their youth neglect their bodily strength 
suffer the clothes of old age with great difficulty.
Athenaeus of Attalia, quoted in Oribasius, Collectiones Medicae (libri incerti 
39) 140,13–36 Raeder
I think we must enjoy our summers.
56  On the role of pneuma in the Pneumatist school of medicine, see Coughlin and Lewis 
(2020). On Athenaeus’ relationship to thinkers other than the Stoics, see Coughlin (2018) 
109–13.
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